In this paper, we consider fundamental communication limits over a compound channel. Covert communication in the information-theoretic context has been primarily concerned with fundamental limits when the transmitter wishes to communicate to legitimate receiver(s) while ensuring that the communication is not detected by an adversary. This paper, however, considers an alternative, and no less important, setting in which the object to be masked is the state of the compound channel. Such a communication model has applications in the prevention of malicious parties seeking to jam the communication signal when, for example, the signal-to-noise ratio of a wireless channel is found to be low. Our main contribution is the establishment of bounds on the throughput-key region when the covertness constraint is defined in terms of the total variation distance. In addition, for the scenario in which the key length is infinite, we provide a sufficient condition for when the bounds coincide for the scaling of the throughput, which follows the square-root law. Numerical examples, including that of a Gaussian channel, are provided to illustrate our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern applications that involve security considerations, it is not only of paramount importance that the message to be transmitted is hidden from malicious parties, but the very act of transmitting a message should be concealed from such parties. This is the study of covert communication and has been extensively studied in the information theory community in recent years [1] - [3] . Here, the transmitter feeds a specific symbol, called the off-symbol, to the channel when it decides not to send a message, signifying that the transmitter is in the off-transmission state. When the transmitter decides to send a bona fide message, the channel, together with the codeword associated to the message, induce a certain output distribution that is different from that when a message is not sent. One desires to design codes such that distinguishing between these two output distributions is difficult in the sense that the failure probability is high. The problem of covert communication over a channel with an additive white Gaussian noise (i.e., an AWGN channel) [1] , a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) [2] , [3] , a classical-quantum channel [4] , a channel with state [5] , in the presence of an adversarial jammer [6] , and from the second-order perspective [7] , [8] have been considered. It is shown that the maximum amount of information that can be sent scales with the square root of the transmission blocklength; this is known as the square-root law. The extension to multi-user setups has been considered for multiple-access channels [9] , broadcast channels [10] and relay channels [11] .
In this work, we consider covert communication over a compound channel with two states s ∈ {1, 2} (see Fig. 1 ). In a compound channel [12] - [14] , the channel law W s depends on the state which remains fixed during the transmission (see Section 7.2 of [15] ). The channel state is known at the transmitter and the receiver. The goal of the communication is to reliably send a message to the receiver subject to a covertness constraint. We define the covertness in this unique setting as follows. An adversary who is observing the channel output cannot reliably distinguish the channel state of communication. The motivation comes from the fact that if the adversary determines the channel state, then there may be a possibility that it interferes with the communication by consuming a small amount of power. For example, consider a wireless channel with fading and for simplicity, assume that the fading takes on one of two states in {"high SNR", "low SNR"}. If a malicious party can deduce that the channel is in the "low SNR" state, then it knows that it is easier to interfere with the communication, possibly by injecting more noise to further disrupt the system by sending jamming signals with a small power consumption. Motivated by this scenario, we consider covert communication over a compound channel. Instead of focusing solely on covertness being measured in terms of the ability of an observer at the receiver being able to distinguish between the absence or presence of message transmission, here we also quantify covertness as the ability of an adversary in distinguishing between the two channel states. That is, we quantify covertness in terms of the probability of success of an adversary in a binary hypothesis test that seeks to distinguish between s ∈ {1, 2}. We wish to design coding schemes such that this probability of success is suitably upper bounded by a small constant, meaning that the adversary's test is unreliable. Our main contribution is in the establishment of bounds that characterize the optimal tradeoff between the throughput for deniable (i.e., the adversary cannot learn whether communication is occurring or what the channel state is) and reliable communication as well as the length of the shared key between the transmitter and receiver. In [16] , covert communication over compound binary symmetric channels was studied but the setting is different from ours. Specifically, the best throughput to deniably (i.e., the adversary cannot learn whether communication is occurring) and reliably communicate was established, whereas our main contribution is to establish bounds on the throughput under the constraint that the adversary cannot learn the channel state. We consider two covertness criteria for this setup.
• For the first criterion, a specific distribution Q 0 over the channel output alphabet Y is fixed. This is similar to traditional works on covert communication such as [2] , [3] in which Q 0 is the distribution that is induced from sending the off-symbol at the input of the channel. For a given blocklength n, the covertness is measured by the Kullback-Leibler (KL)-divergence of the channel output distribution, denoted as Q n s , with Q ×n 0 , which denotes the n-fold product of Q 0 . In order to fix such a distribution Q 0 , it is assumed that there exists two distributions P 1 and P 2 over the channel input alphabet X such that they induce the same channel output marginal when they are fed into channels W 1 and W 2 , respectively and the distribution Q 0 denotes this common marginal. Notice the difference of definition of Q 0 in the compound setup with that of a DMC in [2] , [3] where Q 0 denotes the channel output marginal when the off-symbol is fed into the channel. Here, Q 0 serves to mask the channel state and it does not necessarily correspond to the output marginal of a specific symbol in the input alphabet. Thus, the off-symbol which indicates that the transmitter is in the off-transmission state, does not necessarily exist. Even though an adversary who is observing the channel output may not be able to infer the state of the communication, he can infer whether the transmitter is sending a message. For this covertness criterion, assuming a shared key of infinite length between the transmitter and receiver, we provide the optimal throughput.
• The second covertness criterion, as we shall see based on the motivation above, is more pertinent to the compound channel.
It is defined to be the total variation distance between Q n 1 and Q n 2 , the two output marginal distributions when the state of the channel is s = 1 or s = 2. Here, we assume that a shared key with bounded length is available between the transmitter and receiver. We provide inner and outer bounds on the throughput-key region and show that the square root law [1] also holds in this setting. The bounds match for a special case and thus for this case, we have characterized the optimal transmission rate given a key with a certain length. The achievable scheme uses two codebooks (each of which is used for communication given a channel state) and a maximum likelihood (ML) decoder at the receiver. The analysis of this scheme consists of three steps. The first step is to show that the average error probability of the scheme when averaged over all codebooks, can be appropriately upper bounded. The second step is to provide a single-letter characterization of the covertness metric. The third step is to show that there exists a deterministic codebook that satisfies the desired constraints on the maximum error probability and also the covertness criterion. The proof of outer (converse) bound is challenging since we need to analyze the total variation distance between two non-product distributions Q n 1 and Q n 2 . The single-letter characterization of the covertness metric requires relating the total variation distance to a hypothesis testing problem and using various bounds (Berry-Esseen) to control the false alarm and missed detection probabilities of this test. We conclude this section with a summary of the main contributions, introduction of notation, and the organization of the paper.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• The problem of covert communication for a compound DMC is formulated.
• For the case in which covertness is measured in terms of the total variation distance between Q n 1 and Q n 2 , we provide an inner bound on the the optimal transmission throughput-shared key region (Theorem 1). The proof of this theorem involves three steps which are discussed in Lemmas 1-4.
• If we assume that the key is sufficiently long and the error probability of decoding the message at the legitimate receiver is vanishing, we are able to upper bound the optimal transmission throughput for the same covertness criterion (Theorem 2). It is shown that the upper and lower bounds match for a special case (Theorem 3).
• Examples are provided to compare the lower and upper bounds. In particular, a Gaussian setup is also considered where we identify parameter regimes in which the conditions of the optimality result in Theorem 3 are satisfied. The proof of converse in this theorem needs to be adapted to the Gaussian model since the output alphabet of the Gaussian channel is continuous.
B. Notation
We mostly use the notation of [15] . Random variables are shown by capital letters, e.g., X, Y and their realizations by lower-case letters, e.g., x, y. The alphabets of random variables are denoted by script symbols such as X , Y. The sequence of random variables (X i , . . . , X j ) and its realizations (x i , . . . , x j ) are abbreviated as X j i and x j i respectively. We use X j and x j instead of X j 1 and x j 1 . The empirical distribution of sequence x n is also known as its type. The probability mass function (pmf) of a discrete random variable X defined over the channel input alphabet X denoted using the letter P . The pmf of a discrete random variable Y defined over the channel output alphabet Y is denoted using the letter Q. The distributions of the sequences of random variables X n and Y n are denoted by P n and Q n respectively. The notation P ×n denotes the n-fold product distribution, i.e., for every x n ∈ X n , we have
The expectation and variance operators are written as E[.] and V[.], respectively. The notation 1 {.} denotes the indicator function. The probability of an event E ⊆ X is denoted by P(E).
The KL-divergence, chi-squared distance and total variation distance between two distributions P 1 and P 2 are denoted by D(P 1 P 2 ), χ 2 (P 1 P 2 ) and d TV (P 1 , P 2 ), respectively. The Bhattacharyya distance between two distributions P 1 and P 2 is denoted by F (P 1 , P 2 ) and is defined as F (P 1 , P 2 )
The Hamming weight of sequence x n is denoted by w(x n ). The binary entropy function is shown by h b (.). The binary symmetric channel with parameter is denoted by BSC( ). The Bernoulli distribution, i.e., one that is defined over {0, 1}, is denoted by Bern(.). The cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution is denoted by Φ(.). All logarithms are with respect to the base 2. The exponential function is written as exp(.).
C. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the covert communication setup over a compound channel. Section III provides the lower and upper bounds on the optimal transmission throughput and some examples to discuss the bounds. The paper is concluded in Section IV and by technical appendices.
II. COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER A COMPOUND CHANNEL A. System Model
Consider covert communication over a compound DMC with input and output alphabets X and Y, see Fig. 1 . The compound channel consists of two channel pmfs W s (·|·), s ∈ {1, 2} where the channel state s is available at both the transmitter and the receiver. The message set is shown by M. The transmitter and receiver share a secret key K ∈ K. The transmitter sends an n-length input X n over the channel using a state-dependent encoding function f
The receiver uses a decoding function g (n)
s : Y n × K → M which maps the channel output to an estimated message as follows:
In the conventional covert communication over a single-state point-to-point channel [2] , [3] , a fixed distribution which is denoted by Q 0 , is chosen to represent the single-letter channel output marginal when the transmitter sends the off-symbol. This symbol is fed to the channel when the transmitter decides not to send a message. The covertness is measured by the "distance" between the channel output marginal when a message is sent and the distribution Q ×n 0 . The goal of covert communication over a compound channel is primarily to conceal the channel state. It might be possible to cover message transmission such that an adversary observing the channel output does not know whether an off-symbol or a message is sent. In the following, we consider the different cases where a distribution Q 0 can be fixed for the definition of covert communication over a compound channel.
Case 1 (Only concealing the channel state): In this case, the channel state is masked. However, the message transmission might be revealed to an adversary since an off-symbol does not exist. Specifically, there exist two non-deterministic distributions 1 P 1 and P 2 such that In this case, we define Q 0 to represent the above common channel output marginal between the two states. Here, an adversary who is observing the channel output, cannot infer the channel state. Thus, the distribution Q 0 serves to mask the state of the communication. Here, there does not necessarily exist an input symbol whose channel output marginal is as (4) . Thus, the adversary who is observing the channel output may infer whether the transmitter is sending a message.
An example of this case of covert communication is discussed in the following. Suppose that X = Y = {0, 1}, where W 1 (.|.) and W 2 (.|.) are BSC satisfy Condition (4) and Q 0 (0) = Q 0 (1) = 1/2. Clearly, the distribution Q 0 is not induced by any of the input symbols at both channel states.
Case 2 (Concealing channel state and message transmission): In this case, condition (4) is satisfied only if P 1 and P 2 are deterministic distributions. Thus, there exist symbols "0" and "0 " such that
Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the symbols 0 and 0 are equal, because the transmitter has access to the state 2 . Here, we again call the symbol 0 as off-symbol. Let Q 0 denotes the above common channel output marginal between the two channel states. The distribution Q 0 masks the channel state and also represents the scenario in which the transmitter does not send a message at both channel states.
An example of this case is given in Fig. 2 where we assume that X = {0, 1} and Y = {0, 1, 2}. Notice that the unique distributions satisfying (4) are given by P 1 (0) = P 2 (0) = 1 and P 1 (1) = P 2 (1) = 0. Thus, the symbol "0" can be regarded as the off-symbol.
Case 3 (Concealing channel state and message transmission partially): Condition (4) is satisfied only if P 1 is deterministic while P 2 can be non-deterministic. In this case, we have:
Here, Q 0 denotes the above common channel output marginal. Besides the fact that Q 0 masks the channel state, it also represents the fact that the transmitter has no input to the channel when S = 1. A symmetric case can be considered when P 2 is deterministic and P 1 is non-deterministic.
Case 4 (Revealing channel state and message transmission): There does not exist any pair of distributions P 1 and P 2 such that Condition (4) is satisfied. In this case, covert communication over the compound channel is not feasible.
B. Covertness Criteria
As discussed in the above Cases 1-3, a distribution Q 0 over Y can be fixed. As such we can define the covert rate in a number of different ways depending on the covertness criterion. Two different covertness criteria are considered.
Definition 1: An (n, |M|, |K|)-code consists of a message set M, a key set K, two encoding functions f (n) s : M × K → X n , and two decoding functions g
. For each state s, the code induces the following joint pmf on the random variables (M, K, X n , Y n , M ) 3 :
We denote the channel output marginal on Y n by Q n s . Define:
For this code, the maximum error probability is defined as
Two covertness criteria are considered. The first criterion is that the KL-divergence between the marginal distributions Q n s , s = 1, 2 and the masking distribution Q ×n 0 is sufficiently small. This criterion imposes more restriction on the concealing the channel state in the sense that not only adversary can not infer the channel state, it also can not distinguish the marginal outputs from the masking distribution. The second criterion relaxes this additional requirement. The second criterion requires that the total variation distance between the channel output marginals of the two states, i.e., d TV (Q n 1 , Q n 2 ) to be small. Thus, adversary can not only infer the channel state.
Therefore, we have two definitions:
• An (n, |M|, |K|, , δ 1 , δ 2 , ζ) KL -code is an (n, |M|, |K|)-code such that the KL-divergence covertness terms are no larger than δ 1 and δ 2 , when the state is s = 1 and s = 2, respectively and the maximum error probability is no larger than .
• An (n, |M|, |K|, , δ) TV -code is an (n, |M|, |K|)-code such that the total variation distance as the covertness metric is no larger than δ and the maximum error probability is no larger than .
lim sup
The set of all
and
Remark 1: In this work, we are interested in the cases of ζ =
Definition 3 (Total variation distance as the covertness criterion):
+ is said to be ( , δ)-achievable if there exists a sequence of (n, |M|, |K|, , δ) TV -codes such that (11)- (12) 
C. Basic Results
In this section, we present some basic results on the covert rates to provide more intuition on the model. For simplicity, we assume that an infinite-length key is shared between the transmitter and receiver. The covertness criterion is assumed to be the KL-divergence as in Definition 1. The following proposition states that we can communicate at a positive rate in Case 1. Define:
Proposition 1: Assuming that Case 1 holds and an infinite-length key is shared between the transmitter and receiver, we have:
where the maximum is over all distributions (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ P. Proof: Similar to [2, Proposition 1]. An interesting example of Case 1 is the Gaussian setup which we now discuss in the following. Suppose that at each channel state s ∈ {1, 2}, the channel is given by:
where
, X, Y, Z s ∈ R and X is independent of Z s . We impose an average power constraint on the input such that E |X| 2 ≤ P for some P > 0. In the following, we discuss the scenario in which there exist two non-deterministic distributions P 1 and P 2 such that Condition (4) holds. Thus, a positive rate can be achieved for this example. Consider Proposition 1 and let the second moment of the distribution P s be denoted by ρ s . We know that a Gaussian random variable maximizes I(P s , W s ) among all distributions of the same second moment. Thus, we get:
The distributions P 1 and P 2 satisfy (4) if the following holds:
which yields the following optimal positive rate (with ρ 2 = P,
Notice the difference of this example with the Gaussian setup of [2, Section V]. In the proposed example, a positive rate can be achieved at each channel state. However, in the Gaussian example of [2, Section V], the maximum communication rate in the presence of covertness constraint is zero, i.e., we cannot communicate at a positive rate. As discussed in the previous section, the difference arises from the fact that the goal of covert communication over a compound channel is to mask the state, while in the conventional model, the aim is to keep the adversary oblivious about the state of transmitter, i.e., whether or not a message is sent.
The following proposition presents the optimal covert communication rate of Case 2 which also states that the maximum rate is zero.
Proposition 2: Assuming that Case 2 holds and an infinite-length key is shared between the transmitter and receiver, we have To conclude this section, we briefly discuss the advantage of concealing only the channel state as compared to the setup which requires the strengthen constraint that adversary cannot distinguish between the channel output and the masking distribution. Whenever Case 2 occurs, the latter setup is equivalent to protecting the message transmission from the detection by an adversary, since we have an off-symbol in Case 2. Thus, we compare the message transmission concealing setup versus concealing only the channel state.
Consider the setup of Fig. 3 which satisfies the condition of Case 2. For this example, the KL-divergence D(Q n s Q ×n 0 ) goes to infinity which implies that it is not feasible to conceal the message transmission. However, as will be discussed in Subsection III-D, concealing the channel state under the total variation covertness criterion is possible in the sense that L *
In the following results, we assume that all the transition probabilities W s (.|x), s ∈ {1, 2}, x ∈ X are absolutely continuous with respect to Q 0 (.) (if it exists). This condition ensures us that examples such as that of Fig. 3 are excluded and all involved information quantities are finite. If this assumption is not required, it will be explicitly mentioned in the text. 
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our results when the covertness criterion is considered to be the total variation distance between channel output marginals of the two states (see Definition 3). As discussed in the previous section (see Case 1) , if there exist two non-deterministic input distributions P 1 and P 2 such that Condition (4) holds, then the optimal rate is given by Proposition 1 and the maximum covert communication rate is positive. Thus, we only focus on Case 2 in the following and assume that Condition 4 is satisfied only if P 1 and P 2 are deterministic input distributions. Moreover, recall "0" is the off-symbol such that
A. An Inner Bound to L * TV ( , δ) In the following, we present an inner bound to L * TV ( , δ). The proof is given afterwards. For positive γ 1 , γ 2 and any three distributions Q 0 , Q 1 and Q 2 over Y, define:
where the union is over all input distributionsP s such thatP s (0) = 0 with their output marginals through W s are denoted bȳ Q s and over all positive γ 1 , γ 2 such that
Proof: The achievable scheme is sketched as follows. Two codebooks are generated where each of them is used for communicating over each channel state. The optimal decoder -namely, the ML decoder-is used to determine the message which is sent. The analysis of error probability involves applying Shannon's achievability bound [17, Thm 2] to upper bound the error probability averaged over all codebooks. A main step of the analysis is the single-letter characterization of the covertness metric. Finally, it is shown that there exists a "good" codebook which satisfies desired properties on the maximum error probability and also the covertness criterion.
Preparations: Fix a large blocklength n, choose positive γ s for s ∈ {1, 2}. LetP s be any distribution such thatP s (0) = 0 and denote the output marginal through channel W s byQ s . Choose positive γ s such that (28) holds and let
Define the input distribution P s,n as For s ∈ {1, 2}, let Q s,n denote the output marginal of the channel W s when the input distribution is P s,n . The distribution Q s,n can be written as follows:
Denote the n-fold products of P s,n and Q s,n by P ×n s and Q ×n s , respectively. Codebook Generation: We generate an i.i.d. codebook C s = {x n s (m, k) : m ∈ M, k ∈ K} according to the input distribution P s,n as defined in (30). Denote the channel output marginal by Q n s . Single-letter Characterization of Covertness Condition: The following two lemmas together provide a single-letter characterization of the covertness condition.
Lemma 1: We have
Proof: See Appendix A. Lemma 2: Let κ be an arbitrary positive number. Assume that,
Then, we have
whenever
Proof: See Appendix B. Encoding and Decoding: The transmitter upon observing the message m ∈ M and the key k ∈ K, sends the codeword x n s (m, k) over the channel. Given y n , the decoder based on the secret key k and the state s uses the optimal ML decoder which chooses the messagem as follows:m
The following lemma provides an upper bound on the average error probability as defined in (9) .
Then,
Proof: See Appendix C. Existence of a Codebook with Desired Properties: The following lemma proves existence of a codebook with desired properties.
Lemma 4: If for some positive κ and , constraints (33) and (36) hold, then there are exists at least one "good" codebook such that:
and the maximum error probability as defined in (10), satisfies:
Proof: See Appendix D. The proof is concluded by combining lemmas 1 to 4. See Appendix E for details. Now, we specialize Theorem 1 to the case where the length of key is sufficiently long. Also, we restrict to the case of X = {0, 1} and the output distribution induced by each input symbol is denoted bỹ
This special case will be used later to provide an optimality result. In this case, we are able to find a closed form for the optimization problem (26) under the constraint (28). The solution of this optimization is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Assume that the length of the key is infinite, i.e., L K = ∞ and X = {0, 1}. Then, L * TV ( , δ) is lower bounded as follows:
if
Proof: See Appendix F.
B. An Upper Bound on L * TV (0 + , δ) and an Optimality Result
In this section, we provide an optimality result for L * TV (0 + , δ). We consider two simplifications on the system model. First, it is assumed that the length of key is infinite. Second, we restrict to the case of X = {0, 1} where the output distributions are defined in (40). The following theorem presents an upper bound on L * TV (0 + , δ). Its proof is given after the statement of Theorem 3. Define:
Theorem 2: Assuming
is upper bounded as follows:
The above upper bound is tight in the following special case. Theorem 3 (Optimality Result): Assuming (47) and
Proof: The achievability follows from Corollary 1 and considering the fact that assumptions in (47) and (49) imply the first clause of L in (42) holds. The converse follows from Theorem 2 and using the assumption (49).
Proof of Theorem 2: The proof is sketched as follows. First, we relate the total variation distance to false alarm and missed detection probabilities of a hypothesis testing problem. Then, we upper bound these probabilities which gives a lower bound on the total variation distance. Finally, the proof is concluded by showing that there exists at least one codebook which satisfies the desired property on the total variation distance and also by applying Fano's inequality.
Preparations: For any two codebooks
we define the following parameters:
and ω L,n nµ L,n , ω H,n nµ H,n .
Let
and define
Total Variation Distance and a Hypothesis Testing Problem: We relate the total variation distance to a hypothesis testing problem as follows. Consider the following inequality:
where α n and β n are false alarm and missed detection probabilities of a (possibly suboptimal) hypothesis test for the following setup. Under the null hypothesis H = 1, Y n is distributed according to Q n 1 and under the alternative hypothesis H = 2, it is distributed according to Q n 2 . Define the following suboptimal test:
The following lemma provides upper bounds on the false alarm and missed detection probabilities of this hypothesis test. Lemma 5: We have:
Proof: See Appendix H. Combining (60) and (61) with (57), we get:
which can be equivalently written as follows:
The proof is continued by showing that there exists a sub-codebook which satisfies (63) and its size is at least
and it is concluded by applying Fano's inequality. See Appendix I for details.
Remark 3: Assume that (47) and (49) hold. Then, the choice of γ 1 = γ 2 minimizes the RHS of (26) and maximizes the RHS of (27) in Theorem 1. Thus, it can be seen a small key-length suffices for the optimal setup of Theorem 3. 
C. Examples
In this section, we provide examples that satisfy both conditions of Theorem 3 in (47) and (49) and discuss scenarios in which we can establish optimal covert communication rates.
First, consider the setup of the example in Fig. 2 . This example satisfies the constraints (47) 
For this Gaussian setup, the conditions (47) and (49) of Theorem 3 translate to the following:
Under the above assumptions, we specialize Theorem 3 to the Gaussian setup. 
and conditions (68)-(69) are satisfied, we have
Proof: See Appendix J. 
D. Concealing the message transmission vs concealing the channel state
To conclude this section, we revisit the discussion concerning the difference of concealing the message transmission versus concealing the channel state. In this discussion, we remove the assumption stated in Remark 2 and for simplicity, we assume that the length of the key is infinite.
Recall the example of Fig. 3 . The following observations are in order: 1) As mentioned before, the assumption of Remark 2 does not hold, because W 1 (2|1) = 0, while W 1 (2|0) = 0 and also W 2 (2|1) = 0, while W 2 (2|0) = 0. Thus our results from the previous subsections, do not hold as the assumptions are violated. 2) Consider the achievable scheme of the previous section with the choice µ 1,n = µ 2,n µ n . As shown in Appendix G, under the total variation covertness criterion, if the number of messages |M| satisfies
then the desired constraints on the maximum error probability and covertness metric are satisfied. The above result shows that it is possible to communicate Ω( √ n log n) bits over n channel uses covertly in the sense of concealing of the channel state. However, covert communication in the sense of concealing message transmission is not feasible for this example in the sense that the KL-divergence D Q n s Q ×n 0 tends to infinity as n → ∞.
3) As mentioned in the previous item, the communication rate is at least of the order of Ω log n √ n , which is somewhat surprising, because the communication rate is usually of order Θ 1 √ n for covert communication problems [2] , [3] , as we have observed in our results in the previous subsections. This again shows the importance of the absolutely continuous assumption in Remark 2. 4) Although we will not discuss the details, it is worth mentioning that unlike the achievable scheme of the previous subsection, the choice µ 1,n = µ 2,n is the unique choice which enables sending a positive number of bits under the covert communication constraint.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered covert communication over a compound channel. In this setting, the covertness is defined as the ability of a malicious party in distinguishing the channel state. We provided inner and outer bounds to the optimal throughput-key region and showed that the square-root law holds for this setup. For a special case, the bounds match and establish the optimal throughput. Some examples, including a Gaussian setup, are given to discuss the bounds.
A promising avenue for future work is to study covert communication over a channel with an i.i.d. state S n available at the encoder, the decoder or both. The distribution that generates S n can either be P S1 or P S2 . The main goal in this stochastic-as opposed to deterministic in this paper-setting is to design a code to remain covert such that an adversary who is observing the channel output does not learn the channel state distribution, i.e., P S1 or P S2 . The problem of covert communication over a channel with state has been previously studied in [5] . One can consider an alternative formulation to conceal the distribution of state instead of the presence or absence of message transmission as was done in [5] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First, we present the following theorem (Berry-Esseen Theorem) which will be used repeatedly in the proofs, later. Theorem 4 (Thm 1.6 in [18] ): Let X n (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a collection of n independent random variables where each random variable has a zero mean, variance σ T i , respectively. Then, we have:
Now, consider the following identity for the total variation distance:
Now, we bound each of the probabilities in (75). First, we analyze the first probability. The mean and variance of
are given by the following:
Employing Theorem 4, we obtain
Similarly, we get:
where we define:
Now, consider the following set of approximations:
where (89) follows from the Taylor expansion log(
The equality (93) can be expressed in terms ofΩ (µ 1,n , µ 2,n ) as the following:
Next, we consider the following set of approximations:
where (99) follows from Taylor expansion log(1 + x) = x + o(x) at x = 0, (100) follows because
as µ s,n → 0. Combining (79), (93), (103) and definition of v 1 in (78), we have:
Similarly,
Following similar steps leading to (103), one can show that t s = O . Combining (75), (79), (81), (104) and (105), and considering the fact that v s = Θ 1 n , we obtain the following:
Considering the fact that γ s = √ nµ s,n , completes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
First, we state the following lemma. Lemma 6 (Corollary VII.2 in [19] ): For all positive η s , we have:
Choose
for some positive κ. Notice that from [2] , the following approximations hold:
Thus,
Also, we have
Now, consider the probability term in (108) as follows:
where the last inequality follows from Chebyshev's inequality and the fact that
Combining (108) and (121), we get:
Now, we choose:
With the above choice, we can further upper bound (124) as follows:
This completes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 3
We provide the analysis of the rate constraint in the following. Since the ML decoder results in the smallest probability of error for a given codebook, we can bound the average probability of error using Shannon's achievability bound (threshold decoding) [17, Thm 2] as follows. For every s ∈ {1, 2} and k ∈ K, the average error probability satisfies:
Recall the definition ofV s from (114) and consider the above probability:
where the last inequality follows from Chebyshev's inequality and the steps leading to (123). This completes the proof of lemma.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF A CODEBOOK WITH DESIRED PROPERTIES
First, we state the following theorem which will be used later in the proof. Theorem 5 (McDiarmid's theorem [20] ): Let {X k } n k=1 be independent random variables defined on the set X . Consider a random variable U = f (X n ) where f is a function satisfying the following bounded difference property:
for some positive numbers d i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, for every r > 0,
Step 1 ; and define the following events:
for s = 1, 2.
Consider the probability of this event:
• (a) follows because according to (34), the expectation of the total variation distance is upper bounded by O(n
for sufficiently large n, because
for some κ > 0 that approaches κ as n → ∞, • (b) follows from the union bound. In order to upper bound (138), we use the following lemma due to Liu, et. al. [21] (see also [8] ), showing that the total variation distance of a random codebook is concentrated around its expectation.
Lemma 7 (Theorem 31 in [21] ): Consider a channel with the probability transition W and an input probability distribution P X . Suppose that P Y is the output distribution of the channel with the input distribution P X . Let
2 ).
Using the above lemma with the following specifications,
we get the following upper bound on the term (138) as follows:
where (d) follows because
where the last inequality follows from [22] . Thus, in summary, we get:
for sufficiently large n.
Step 2: Probability of Satisfying the Reliability Condition: Now, define the following event:
Using the McDiarmid's theorem, we shall prove the following lemma, which can be thought as dual to Lemma 7, Lemma 8 (Concentration of average error probability around its expectation): For all k ∈ K and any ∆ > 0, we have
This lemma with ∆ = n − 1 6 and the union bound imply
for sufficiently large n, since log |K| = O( √ n).
Proof of Lemma 8:
Note that for a random codebook C s , the random variableP e (s, k) is a function of |M| independent random variables X n s,1,k , · · · , X n s,|M|,k . In this case,P e (s, k) can be written as follows:
whereP c (s, k) is the probability of correct decoding. Define:
We next show that g satisfies the bounded difference property in (133), soP e (s, k) satisfies the bounded difference property as well. Let (x 
Let the ML solution be defined asm
We should show that g(x Step 3: Expurgation: Combining (152) and (155), we get:
Thus, there exists a codebook C *
For the codebook C * s , for all s ∈ {1, 2} and k ∈ K, we have:
where we used the bound in Lemma 3. We then remove a|M| codewords from the codebook C * s with largest P e (s, m, k) for all k ∈ K and s ∈ {1, 2} from the subcodebook {X 
Further, (152) implies that
. This completes the proof of existence of a codebook with desired properties.
APPENDIX E CONCLUSION OF PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Using Lemma 4, if the constraints (33) and (36) hold, then there exists a codebook such that the maximum error probability and the following are satisfied:
where (a) follows from (38) and Lemma 1 and (b) follows from (28). Dividing both sides of (33) and (36) by √ n and letting n → ∞, we get:
where we have used the approximation I(P s,n , W s ) =
. Performing Fourier-Motzkin elimination in (171)-(172) and letting κ → 0, concludes the proof of the theorem.
APPENDIX F SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM (26)
Define:χ
. Also, recall the definition ofD s from (111). The inequality (28) can be written as follows:χ
The optimization problem in (26) is given by the following:
The above optimization problem is equivalently written as:
Since the above optimization problem is convex, we have:
Define
We calculate the derivative of G with respect to γ 1 and γ 2 and let it be zero to get the optimal values γ * 1 and γ * 2 . Thus, we obtain
This yields:
From (178), we know that
Thus, we have: FIG. 3 First, notice that for the proposed example, we have
where µ n = γ √ n for some positive γ such that
Now, consider the following upper bound on total variation distance in terms of Bhattacharyya distance [23, Lemma 3.3.9 ]
Since Q are product distributions, one can show that:
Calculation of the Bhattacharyya distance for two pmfs Q 1,n and Q 2,n yields the following:
where (194) follows from Taylor series (192) and (194), we have the following upper bound on total variation distance:
where ( 2n → exp(−x) as n → ∞.
To find a lower bound on the optimal throughput, one can repeat the same steps as in Appendices B, C, D and get similar results with the following approximations:
Thus, Lemmas 3 and 4 state that if we have
then the desired constraints on the maximum error probability and the (total variation) covertness criterion are satisfied. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX H PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let P n be the set of all types π X over X n and C s,π X be the sub-codebook of C s consisting of all codewords with the same type π X . Notice that
Let P X n s be the uniform distribution over the codebook C s = {x n s (m, k) : m ∈ M, k ∈ K}, i.e., for every x n ∈ X n :
In the following, we first consider false alarm probability and next the missed detection probability. Consider the false alarm probability as follows:
Since
remains the same for each x n with the same type, and {P X n 1 {C 1,π X }} π X ∈P n is a probability distribution, we have
where x n 1 above refers to any vector with type π X . Denoting the maximizing type in (211) by π * and letting x * n be any vector with type π * , (211) can be written as follows:
Notice that π * relates to the Hamming weight of the codeword x * n as follows:
We also define
Since the channel is memoryless,
are mutually independent so Theorem 4 can be applied to upper bound the probability in (212). For every x * n with type π * , we calculate
in the following. First, we calculate the expectation as follows,
where (216) follows because when
and the expectation in the summand is equal to zero. Next, we calculate the variance as follows
Now, we calculate each expectation term in (220) as follows,
Combining (220), (223) and (230), we get
We now bound the sum of the third absolute moments
We know that T test (y i ) =Q
. Hence,
By the triangle inequality,
Combining (233) and (235), we obtain
Notice that V 1,n in (232) is further upper bounded as follows:
Thus, from Theorem 4, we get the following:
Combining (211) and (241), we get the following:
where the maximization is over all µ 1,n such that µ L,n ≤ µ 1,n ≤ µ H,n . Now, consider the missed detection probability as follows:
Following similar steps leading to (211), we can write the missed detection probability as:
where the maximization is over all µ 2,n such that µ L,n ≤ µ 2,n ≤ µ H,n and we define:
We can further upper bound V 2,n as follows:
The proof is followed by upper bounding the false alarm and missed detection probabilities using the choice of τ in (56):
for all 0 < y < x. With the choice of τ in (56), β n in (242) can be upper bounded as follows: for all 0 < y < x. This completes the proof of lemma.
APPENDIX I CONCLUSION OF PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In the following, we first show that there exists a sub-codebook which satisfies (63) and its size is at least |M|·|K| √ n . Define the following set of codewords for some γ > 0:
where E is chosen such that 
where ξ s |Ds| |M|·|K| . Without loss of generality, assume that ξ 1 ≥ ξ 2 . Then, we get the following:
where the last inequality follows from the triangle inequality. We know that for any x n s ∈ C s \D s ,
Combining (63) with (272) and considering (266), we can further lower bound the total variation distance as follows:
where the last inequality follows from (266). Uniting (271) and (274) yields
If we choose γ = 1 √ n , we obtain
In summary, from the assumption ξ 1 ≥ ξ 2 , we obtain a set of codewords with size
and the Hamming weight of these codewords is given by
Since we have assumed ξ 1 ≥ ξ 2 , inequality (277) can be equivalently written as:
For each k ∈ K, we denote the sub-codebook of all codewords with the same key k by C 
The codewords in the sub-codebook |D k s,i | have the same type which we denote by π i s . This sub-codebook is with maximum probability of error not larger than . Using Fano's inequality, we can write the following set of inequalities for s ∈ {1, 2}:
(1 − ) log |D 
Next, we continue to upper bound the size of the message set as follows: 
where (a) follows from (281), (b) follows from the definition in (282), (c) follows from inequality (286). Dividing both sides of (292) by √ n and taking limits in n completes the proof.
APPENDIX J PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
For the proposed Gaussian setup, the lower bound to L * TV ( , δ) in Theorem 3 can be generalized for a continuous alphabet. Several steps in the proof of upper bound to L 1 2 log(2πeσ 
From (322) and the assumption D(Q 1 Q 0 ) = D(Q 2 Q 0 ), we get the condition (69). Next, consider the chi-squared distance χ 2 (Q s Q 0 ) as follows: 
Finally, we evaluate the term ρ(Q 1 ,Q 2 , Q 0 ) as the following: 
